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PROTECTIVE SEARCH VALID: 
OFFICERS POSSESSED A 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
R. v. Wade, 
(2001) Docket:C36714 (OntCA) 
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that the law infringed on the accused’s free choice, the 
Court concluded that the public interest occasionally 
must place constraints on this freedom; in this case 
“society’s need to promote the welfare and well being 
of its citizens”. Furthermore, although there is an 
exemption in the legislation permitting a rider to wear 
a turban instead of a helmet, the accused failed to 
establish that the helmet law discriminated against his 
V
Jrecently dismissed, in part, the 
conviction appeal of the accused for 
a serious offence involving a 
irearm. Police had received a detailed, compelling, and 
urrent tip from a complainant who had identified 
imself by name, address, and phone number. There 
ere sufficient similarities between the scene the 
fficers found and the scene as described by the 
omplainant despite a dissimilarity in clothing 
escribed by the tipster; the objective factors were 
ufficient to constitute a reasonable suspicion 
articulable cause) that the accused had committed a 
erious crime involving a firearm. While there were not 
ufficient grounds to arrest, the officer’s belief did 
ranscend “a mere intuition or hunch based only on 
ubjective factors” and it was the discovery of a 
irearm from the pat down search conducted that 
ubsequently led to the arrest. 
omplete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
BICYCLE HELMET LAW NOT 
DISCRIMINATORY 
R. v. Warman, 2001 BCSC 1771 
The British Columbia Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal of an accused 
religious or other rights. As the Court noted: 
 
Merely because exemptions from the application of 
legislation for reasons such as religion result in people 
being treated differently, does not automatically lead to 
the conclusion suggested…that those who fail to come 
within the exemption are being discriminated against. 
Although most legislation is of general application, some 
legislation does for specific reasons occasionally contain 
exemptions for certain groups. I conclude that such 
exemptions cannot lead to a person falling outside the 
exempt group successfully arguing that the exemption 
discriminates against him or her. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
NO MAGIC FORMULA IN 
PROVIDING RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 
R. v. McKenzie, 2001 ABCA 304 
 
The accused was interviewed by a 
polygraph operator to determine 
whether he was responsible for the 
killing of a missing 12 year old girl. 
The accused had agreed to submit to 
a polygraph interview and conceded that he was neither 
arrested nor detained during the pre-interview who had been convicted of not 
wearing a helmet while riding a 
bicycle. The accused argued the 
rovision of the Motor Vehicle Act (s.184) requiring a 
icycle rider to wear a protective helmet violated his 
ight of free choice and was discriminatory because 
ertain groups were exempted from complying with the 
ection based on their religious beliefs. In recognizing  
olume 2 Issue 1 
anuary 2002 process. The accused was repeatedly told that he did 
not have to speak to the police, did not need to say 
anything without first speaking to a lawyer, and that 
the police would refrain from questioning him should he 
chose to speak with counsel. During the interview the 
accused admitted he had not been completely truthful 
and requested to speak with a lawyer. The accused was 
provided with an opportunity but was unable to contact 
counsel. The accused left for his bank to attend to 
 some business; later returning to the police 
detachment where he was interviewed and admitted 
killing the young girl by running over her while 
intoxicated, burning her body, and throwing the 
remains off a bridge. At this point the accused was 
arrested for murder. The accused was reminded of his 
Charter rights and the interview continued. The 
accused argued that his pre-arrest statements were 
inadmissible because the police failed to provide the 
additional information component mandated in R. v. 
Prosper (1994) 92 CCC (3d) 353 (SCC). In Prosper, the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that where a person has 
asserted their right to counsel and has been reasonably 
diligent in exercising it, the police are obligated to 
inform the person of their right to a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel and that the police must 
hold off from eliciting evidence, pending the exercise 
of that right. This additional informational requirement 
ensures that the person properly understands what the 
rights are that they are relinquishing.  
 
For the purpose of this case, the Alberta Court of 
Appeal assumed, without deciding, that the accused 
was both detained during the pre-arrest interview, had 
asserted his right, and was reasonably diligent in 
exercising it. The Court found that the police on at 
least three occasions indicated they would hold off 
questioning if the accused wished to call a lawyer. The 
accused argued the choice of words used by the police 
did not sufficiently satisfy this informational 
component. For example, the police indicated they “will” 
hold off questioning while the accused contended they 
“must” hold off questioning. In rejecting the accused’s 
appeal, the Court found “no magic formula need be 
spoken” but the message must be clear. In this case, 
the police complied with the Prosper requirements in 
both “spirit and in substance”. 
 
Editor’s Note: In British Columbia, the Charter card 
issued to police officers by the Attorney General 
contains the additional informational requirement, 
addressing the issues identified in Prosper. The 
selected wording is as follows: 
 
You have the right to a reasonable opportunity to contact 
counsel.  I am obliged not to take a statement from you or to 
ask you to participate in any process which could provide 
incriminating evidence until you are certain about whether you 
wish to exercise that right. 
Do you understand? 
What do you wish to do? 
 RIGHT TO COUNSEL: 
UNDERSTANDING YOUR 
DUTIES 
Part 1 of 2 
 Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
The right to counsel is designed 
to ensure that persons 
arrested or detained are 
treated fairly in the criminal 
process. A detainee or arrestee 
is placed in a position of 
disadvantage relative to the 
state authorities and may be at 
risk of incriminating themselves
disadvantage, the person is entitled
at the outset of an arrest or de
obtain appropriate advice to mak
One of the main functions of a 
stage of detention or arrest 
existence of the right to remain s
person about how to exercise that 
the opportunity to receive instruct
order that the detainee may make
choice about what to say or not to 
 
It is important to understand that
does not arise from police investig
in the absence of detention2, but 
of detention or arrest3. If there
arrest, there is no requirement to
their rights under s.10 of the Cha
the right to counsel does not exte
investigations5 such as the mere as
the start of an investigation fro
later turn out to be involved in crim
police officer is entitled to quest
whom they believe useful informat
However, the police are not, as a g
                                                 
1 R. v. Manninen [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233 (S.C.C.), R. v. He
(S.C.C.) 
2 R. v. Evans [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.) per Stevenso
3 R. v. Prosper [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.), R. v. Debo
R. v. M.C. [1998] B.C.J. No.1582 (B.C.S.C.) at para.53
(3d) 358 (Nfld.C.A.) at p.366, R. v. Cho 2000 BCCA 6
(1995) 98 C.C.C. (3d) 176 B.C.C.A. at p.193, R. v. Espo
(Ont. C.A.) appeal to S.C.C. refused (1986) at p. 97. 
4 R. v. Yorke (1990) 54 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (Ont.C.A.) at p
C.C.C. (3d) 88 (Ont.C.A.) at p.97 leave to appeal to S.
(1988) 41 C.C.C. (3d) 75 (N.S.C.A.) at p.78., R. v. Mac
(N.S.C.A.) at p.133, R. v. Hanneson (1989) 88 C.C.C. (3
5 R. v. Hebert [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) 
6 R. v. Kay (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 500 (B.C.C.A.) at p.50
C.C.C. (3d) 239 (Man.C.A.). 
Volume 2 Issue 1 
January 2002 . To remedy this 
 to speak to counsel 
tention so they may 
e informed choices.  
lawyer at the early 
is to confirm the 
ilent and advise the 
right1.  This includes 
ion from a lawyer in 
 a rational, informed 
say to the police.   
 the right to counsel 
ation or questioning 
arises from the fact 
 is no detention or 
 advise a person of 
rter4. Consequently, 
nd to pre-detention 
king of questions at 
m people who might 
inal acts6. In fact, a 
ion any person from 
ion may be obtained. 
eneral rule, entitled 
bert [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 
n J. 
t [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 (S.C.C.), 
, R. v. Keats  (1987) 39 C.C.C. 
58 at para. 45, R. v. Williams 
sito (1985) 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88 
.329, R. v. Esposito (1985) 24 
C.C. refused., R. v. MacDonald 
Lean (1987) 36 C.C.C. (3d) 127 
d)  467 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 472. 
6, R. v. D.E.M. (2001) 156 
2
 to compel the person to answer nor forcibly detain the 
person for questioning7.  
 
Section 10 of the Charter is divided into two 
corresponding duties: 
 
1. informational duties 
(the right to be informed 
promptly of the reason 
for arrest or detention 
and the right to be 
informed of the right to 
retain and instruct 
counsel without delay)  
 
2. implementational duties8 (t
instruct counsel without d
procedural aspects or duties
to ensure that a person
constitutional right to couns
 
INFORMATIONAL DUT
 
Duty to Advise 
 
Section 10 requires the police f
informational duties. Section 
requires the officer to inform
reason for the detention or arre
an onus on the police to inform
right to counsel. These cons
guaranteed to every person und
(regardless of whether the p
agreeable; belligerent or pass
cooperative10). 
 
Section 10(a) 
 
Section 10(a) has a dual rationa
to be promptly advised of the re
arrest. First, the right to be 
grounds for detention or arrest
common law requiring the det
sufficient detail so that they 
reason why it is claimed that 
liberty should be imposed. A pe
submit to a detention or arrest
reasons for it. The second rati
the right to counsel conferred by s.10(b)11. The purpose 
of this information is to advise the person of the risk 
or jeopardy caused by the arrest or detention. A 
person can only make an appropriate decision as to 
whether or not they should contact counsel, and if the 
decision is to contact counsel, to obtain meaningful 
advice by advising counsel as to the extent of their 
                                              
7 R. v. Moran (1987) 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont.C.A.)
8 See next issue for part 2 where the implement
examined. 
9 R. v. Logan et al (1988) 46 C.C.C. (3d) 354 (Ont.
(S.C.C.) 
10 R. v. Young (1987) 38 C.C.C. (3d) 452 (N.B.C.A.)
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 unless one knows the 
onale is its adjunct to 
jeopardy12. Therefore, the right to retain and instruct 
counsel is undermined if the person does not have 
sufficient information to assess the extent of their 
jeopardy13.  
   
 at p.258. 
ational duties of the police are 
C.A.) affirmed 58 C.C.C. (3d) 391 
 per Ryan J.A. at p.467. 
 
In determining whether there has been a breach of 
s.10(a), the court will consider the substance of what 
the person can reasonably be supposed to understand 
rather than the formalism of the precise words used.  
The emphasis will be on the reality of the total 
situation as it impacts on the understanding of the 
person, not the technical detail, precise charge, or 
whether the person was aware of all the factual details 
of the case14. Thus, the proper test in finding a s.10(b) 
violation linked to s.10(a) is whether what the person 
was told, viewed reasonably in all the circumstances, 
undermined their right to counsel15. 
 
Section 10(b) 
 
Section 10(b) encompasses two rights16: 
 
• the right on arrest or detention to retain and  
instruct counsel without delay, and 
 
• the right  to be informed of that right  
 
The purpose of the informational component of s.10(b) 
is to enable a person to make an informed choice about 
whether to exercise the right to counsel and to 
exercise other rights protected by the Charter such as 
the right to silence17. The detainee or arrestee has the 
right to be properly informed (including clear 
communication18) and the responsibility for conveying 
the advice in comprehensible terms rests with the 
police effecting the detention or arrest19.  Simply 
stated, the person has the right of being informed in 
                                                 
11 R. v. Evans (1991) 63 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.). 
12 R. v. Wong (1998) Docket:CA022945 B.C.C.A., R. v. Black [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138 
(S.C.C.) 
13 R. v. Power (1993) 81 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Nfld.C.A.) per Goodridge J.A. at p.6. 
14 R. v. Smith [1991] 1 S.C.R. 714 (S.C.C.), see also R. v. Ballantyne 1997 
Docket:10929 B.C.S.C. at para.21. 
15 R. v. Evans [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.) per McLachlin J. 
16 R. v. Hollis (1992) 76 C.C.C. (3d) 421 (B.C.C.A.) at p.431, R. v. McAvena (1987) 34 
C.C.C. (3d) 460 (Sask.C.A.) 
17 R. v. Latimer  [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) at para.33. 
18 R. v. Hollis (1992) 76 C.C.C. (3d) 421 (B.C.C.A.) at p.431. 
19 R. v. Kennedy (1995) 103 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (Nfld.C.A.) at p.181 
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 terms they understand20.  For example, it would not be 
acceptable to a French speaking person to be advised 
of their rights in English if they did not understand 
English, or to tell a person of their rights in highly 
technical language.  The exact language of the Charter 
need not be used as long as the person is clearly 
informed of every aspect of their right to counsel21. 
 
Ordinarily the person will acknowledge they understand 
their rights that have been clearly communicated to 
them by the police and it can be inferred from the 
circumstances that the person understands what they 
have been told22. The question is not whether the 
message communicated by the police was 
comprehended but whether it was comprehensible23. 
The police are not required to assure themselves the 
detainee fully understands s.10(b)24. The courts 
recognize that the circumstances of an arrest are 
frequently highly charged and do not readily lend 
themselves to a fine-tuned, objective analysis by the 
police of the extent of a person's knowledge of their 
rights25.  
 
There is no duty on the police to probe into the 
person's degree of understanding or comprehension 
unless there are special circumstances such as mental 
impairment26 or language difficulty, or if words or 
conduct cause a reasonable inference that the person 
did not understand.27 Failure to acknowledge explicitly 
that they understand their right or failed to request 
an opportunity to exercise their rights does not 
necessarily constitute a violation of the right to 
counsel28. In many circumstances, a question as to 
whether the person understands the right ends the 
officer's obligation29. In the absence of evidence to 
suggest the contrary, a constitutionally sufficient 
understanding of the right to counsel will be inferred 
from a positive response to the question "do you 
understand?"30. Where the person chooses not to 
retain and instruct counsel then speaks to police, the 
statement obtained is not inconsistent with the 
Charter31. 
                                                 
                                                
20 R. v. MacCormack (1988) 71 Nfld. & P.E.I. R. 347 (P.E.I. C.A.), R. v. Campbell 
(1989) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 93 (P.E.I. C.A.) at p. 94. 
21 R. v. Dubois (1990) 54 C.C.C. (3d) 166 (Que, C.A.) per Fish J.A. 
22 R. v. Evans [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.) 
23 R. v. Kennedy (1995) 103 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (Nfld.C.A.) at p.181 
24 R. v. Bartle [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.) 
25 R. v. Butler (1995) 104 C.C.C. (3d) 198 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to Supreme Court 
of Canada refused 105 C.C.C. (3d) vi. 
26 See R. v. Johnny [1984] B.C.J. No. 749 (B.C.S.C.) where the court found a breach 
because he was not capable of understanding the information provided by police. 
The accused's vocabulary was assessed as that of a 6 year old, his reading 
comprehension a grade 4.2 level, and he was deficient in intellectual development 
from being totally deaf for 4 years. See also R. v. Evans [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869. 
27 R. v. Baig (1985) 20 C.C.C. (3d) 515 (Ont.C.A.) affirmed [1987] 2 S.C.R. 537 
(S.C.C.), see also R. v. Kennedy (1995) 103 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (Nfld.C.A.) at p.182. 
28 R. v. Baig (1985) 20 C.C.C. (3d) 515 (Ont.C.A.) affirmed [1987] 2 S.C.R. 537 
(S.C.C.) 
29 R. v. Anderson (1984) 10 C.C.C. (3d) 417 (Ont.C.A.) at p.422., R. v. Hollis (1992) 
76 C.C.C. (3d) 421 (B.C.C.A.) at p.432. 
 
Conversely, where there is a positive indication that a 
person does not understand their right to counsel the 
police cannot rely simply on the mechanical recitation 
of the right to counsel in order to discharge their 
responsibilities under s.10(b)32. If there are indications 
that the person has not sufficiently understood or 
appreciated their right to counsel when it has been 
conveyed to them, the police duty to inform will entail 
such steps as are necessary to facilitate adequate 
comprehension33. For example, in R. v. Evans (1991) 63 
C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.), the police, who were aware the 
accused was hampered by a mental deficiency 
bordering on retardation, should have taken special 
care to make sure he understood his right to counsel. 
In failing to make a reasonable effort in explaining to 
the accused his right to counsel, the police violated 
s.10(b) of the Charter. 
 
In short, a  person who does not understand their right 
to counsel cannot be expected to assert the right34. 
The police must take affirmative steps to facilitate 
understanding if confusion or lack of understanding 
exists35. In assessing whether a person appreciates the 
information provided, their oral responses and 
externally exhibited capacity to understand may be 
reasonably interpreted as coming from an individual 
who has appreciated the information given to them36. 
 
Language Barriers 
 
Where a language barrier exists such that a person 
may require an interpreter to overcome an obvious 
difficulty with the English language, the failure of the 
police to provide an interpreter will result in a breach 
of the person's s.10(b) rights. If the person's 
knowledge of the English language does not permit 
sufficient comprehension of their rights, "special 
circumstances" arise requiring the officer to 
adequately inform the person in their native language 
through the assistance of a card, interpreter, or 
 
30 R. v. Hollis (1992) 76 C.C.C. (3d) 421 (B.C.C.A.) at p.433 
31 R. v. Anderson (1984) 10 C.C.C. (3d) 417 (Ont.C.A.) at p.422. 
32 R. v. Evans [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.), see also R. v. McAvena (1987) 34 C.C.C. 
(3d) 460 (Sask.C.A.), R. v. Mohl (1987) 34 C.C.C. (3d) 435 (Sask.C.A.) per Vanise 
J.A.), R. v. Dubois (1990) 54 C.C.C. (3d) 166 (Que C.A.) per Fish J.A.) 
33 R. v. Kennedy (1995) 103 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (Nfld.C.A.) at p.181-2. 
34 R. v. Evans [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.). 
35 R. v. Burlingham [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.) per Iacobucci J. 
36 R. v. Kennedy (1995) 103 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (Nfld.C.A.) at p.183. 
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 bilingual officer37. Failure to do so amounts to a 
violation of the police obligation to provide an adequate 
understanding of the right to counsel38. Although a 
reasonable time arranging interpreter services will be 
permitted, s.10(b) rights will be breached by the 
failure  of police to advise an arrestee of their right to 
counsel 11 hours after it was apparent the person did 
not understand their rights when the rights were read 
in English39. For the deaf this may require sign language 
communication or written explanation of the right to 
counsel. 
 
Legal Aid and Duty Counsel  
 
 
In addition to advising detainees or 
their general right to counsel, the 
police must advise the person of the 
existence and availability of legal 
aid and duty counsel40. Therefore, 
as part of the informational 
component the police have a duty 
to advise all arrested and 
detained persons of: 
 
• basic information about access to Legal Aid. 
“Legal aid” refers to an organized program paid for 
by the government providing free legal advice and 
counsel to an accused person (they must meet the 
prescribed financial criteria set by the provincial 
Legal Aid plan). 
 
• basic information about access to duty counsel. 
“Duty counsel” refers to immediate, although 
temporary, free legal advice provided to persons 
detained or arrested irrespective of their financial 
status. Duty counsel is generally intended to 
provide assistance to those persons who cannot 
afford a lawyer or who do not know a lawyer, but is 
available to anyone on arrest or detention who 
requires immediate assistance.  This advice 
“bridge[s] the gap between a detainee’s initial 
contact with [police] and the time the detainee is 
able to retain counsel, either privately or through 
Legal Aid”41. In addition, duty counsel may also 
inform the unrepresented person about making an 
application for Legal Aid. Other important 
functions of duty counsel include representing the 
person on an application for remand or bail.  
                                                                                                 
37 R. v. Vanstaceghem (1987) 36 C.C.C. (3d) 142 (Ont.C.A.) at p.147-148. 
38 R. v. Lim (No.3) (1990) 1 C.R.R. (2d) 148 (Ont.H.C.).  
39 R. Tam (1995) 100 C.C.C. (3d) 196 (B.C.C.A.) at p.209. 
40 R. v. Bartle [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.), R. v. Brydges [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.) , 
R. v. Cobham [1994] 3 S.C.R. 360 (S.C.C.), R. v. Harper [1994] 3 S.C.R. 343 (S.C.C.), 
R. v. Pozniak [1994] 3 S.C.R. 310 (S.C.C.), R. v. Prosper [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.), 
R. v. Kennedy (1995) 103 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (Nfld.C.A.) at p.180. 
41 R. v. Russell (2000) 150 C.C.C. (3d) 243 (N.B.C.A.) at p. 251. 
 
To fulfil this obligation, the informational duty need 
consist of no more than telling a detainee in plain 
language that the person will be provided with a 
telephone number should they wish to contact counsel 
right away42. The actual 1-800 number need not be 
provided as part of the informational warning43, but will 
be required once the person asserts the right to 
contact duty counsel or legal aid. 
 
Right to Be Informed of Privacy 
 
Although it is not clear whether there is an 
informational duty as a requirement of the Charter to 
advise a detainee or arrestee that they have the right 
to contact counsel in private, 
the courts have 
recommended that it "may be 
wise to provide such 
warning"44. The Charter 
Warning issued by the 
Ministry of the Attorney 
General includes the words 
"in private". This will address 
any issues arising as to 
whether the person was aware of their right to consult 
counsel in private. 
 
Standard Charter Warning 
 
It is important that the standard, or customary, 
Charter warning given to a person respecting their 
right to counsel be as instructive and clear as 
possible45. To this end, the Ministry of Attorney 
General has developed a "Charter" card that 
standardizes and addresses various court decisions to 
ensure the proper information is communicated to the 
person. Although the card ensures all the informational 
duties of the police are fulfilled, occasions may arise 
where the mere recitation of the card will not suffice. 
In circumstances where a particular individual may not 
understand the information being communicated to 
them, the police must take additional steps to ensure 
the person comprehends their s.10(b) rights46. 
 
42 R. v. Bartle [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.), R. v. Cobham [1994] 3 S.C.R. 360 (S.C.C.), 
R. v. Poudrier 1998 Docket CA023213 B.C.C.A. 
43 R. v. Ireland [1998] B.C.J. No. 2510 (B.C.S.C.).  
44 R. v. Butler (1995) 104 C.C.C. (3d) 198 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to Supreme Court 
of Canada refused 105 C.C.C. (3d) vi., see also R. v. Jackson (1993) 86 C.C.C. (3d) 
233 (Ont.C.A.). 
45 R. v. Bartle [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.). 
46 R. v. Bartle [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.). 
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 Any time a person is arrested or detained it is 
recommended that the Charter warning be given to 
that person by reading it directly from the Charter 
card. This will ensure that the person is adequately 
advised of the required informational components of 
s.10(b). Additionally, a police officer may be required 
to advise the court the exact words used in informing 
the person of their right to counsel. If the officer can 
testify that they read the standard Charter warning, 
this practice will ensure accuracy and avoid any 
problems that may arise if the officer chooses to rely 
on their memory. If however, the informational 
component is insufficient and the person nonetheless 
contacts counsel, any argument of the efficacy of the 
warning is illusory because the objective of the warning 
has been satisfied47. 
 
Interrupted Charter Warning 
 
The fact that a person is aware of the right to counsel 
does not necessarily preclude the obligation of the 
police under s.10(b) to advise that person of their right 
to counsel.  The right to being informed is a clear, 
unqualified right notwithstanding the foreknowledge of 
the right to counsel48. A detainee may explicitly waive 
their right to be informed of counsel provided the 
circumstances reveal a reasonable basis for believing 
the detainee in fact knows and has averted to their 
rights and is aware of the means by which these rights 
can be exercised. For example, a person may interrupt 
the police when the police begin to read the rights and 
tell the police they need not continue. The fact a 
person merely indicates that they know their rights will 
not, by itself, provide a reasonable basis for believing 
that the detainee in fact fully understands the extent 
and means by which the right to counsel may be 
implemented. The police have an obligation to take 
reasonable steps to ensure the detainee is aware of all 
the information they have the right to receive. The 
simplest way to discharge this duty is to read the 
standard warning to every person49.  
 
Delay in Informing of Right to Counsel 
 
The police are not obliged to read a person their 
s.10(b) rights the instant they are detained or 
arrested in all cases. The police are permitted some 
latitude in assessing or gaining control over a situation 
to determine whether a potentially dangerous situation 
exists50. Delay in the interests of legitimate self-
protection is permissible because the police are not 
expected to risk their lives or safety51. This type of 
delay is concerned with officer safety and not with 
investigative convenience or efficiency. A delay in 
informing a person of their right to counsel may also 
arise in circumstances of urgency or necessity.  It may 
be necessary to obtain information prior to advising 
the person of their right to counsel, which is 
important, rather than the need to restrict a person's 
movements by detention or arrest52.  
                                                                               
                                                
 
47 R. v. Ouellette  (1996) 111 C.C.C. (3d) 336 (N.B.C.A.) at p.339. 
48 R. v. Greene (1991) 62 C.C.C. (3d) 344 (Nfld.C.A.) 
49 R. v. Bartle [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.) 
 
Circumstances justifying a delay in informing the 
person may include occasions where the person is not in 
a position to understand their right to counsel. For 
example, if a person was unconscious at the time of 
detention, the obligation to inform would not arise until 
the person was in a position to understand the 
information. The person must be in a position to 
understand the advice given to them before the 
obligation arises to give it53. 
 
Right to Be Re-Informed 
 
Section 10(b) states that the right to counsel arises 
"on arrest or detention".  This indicates a point in time, 
not a continuum54. Although the right to counsel 
continues after the initial instruction and retention, 
s.10(b) does not deal with a continuing right to be re-
instructed (informed) before every occasion on which 
the police elicit a statement55. However, there may be 
occasions where there is a duty on the police to advise 
a person of their right to counsel on a second or a 
subsequent occasion. This additional right to be advised 
of the right to retain and instruct counsel may arise 
where: 
• new circumstances arise indicating that the 
person is a suspect for a different or unrelated 
offence than was the case at the time of the 
first warning56 (additional charges. This includes 
additional offences of the same nature57). 
 
50 R. v. Feeney [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 (S.C.C.) L'Heueux-Dube, Gonthier, and McLachlin 
JJ. 
51 R. v. Debot [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 (S.C.C.) per Wilson J. 
52 R. v. Elshaw [1991] 3 S.C.R. 24 (S.C.C.) per Iacobucci J.  
53 R. v. MacDonald (1988) 41 C.C.C. (3d) 75 (N.S.C.A.) at p.80. 
54 R. v. Bouchard (1994) 94 C.C.C. (3d) 380 (N.B.C.A.) at p.382, R. v. McLean (1989) 
50 C.C.C. (3d) 326 (Ont. C.A.). 
55 R. v. Logan (1988) 46 C.C.C. (3d) 354 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. M.C. [1998] B.C.J. No. 1582 
(B.C.S.C.) at para. 53, R. v. McLean (1989) 50 C.C.C. (3d) 326 (Ont. C.A.), R. V. 
Purdon (1989) 52 C.C.C. (3d) 270 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 275, R. v. Cuff (1989) 49 C.C.C. 
(3d) 65 (Nfld. C.A.) at p. 71. 
56 R. v. Evans [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.) per MacLachlin at pp.892-93. 
57 R. v. Witts (1998) 124 C.C.C. (3d) 410 (Man.C.A.) at p.414. 
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 • new circumstances arise indicating that the 
person is a suspect for a significantly more 
serious offence than the offence contemplated 
at the time of the first warning58 (a charge is 
raised to a more serious charge-the extent of a 
person's jeopardy is increased) 
 
This additional right to be informed of the right to 
counsel arises because the person's original decision as 
to whether to consult counsel may well be affected by 
the new or different situation and requires a 
reconsideration of the person's initial waiver. This 
protects the individual from police manipulation 
whereby the police, in hoping to question a detainee 
without counsel present, arrest a person on a relatively 
minor offence (where the presence of a lawyer may not 
be necessary) in order to question the person regarding 
a more serious offence. It may not be necessary that 
the police officer re-read the person their rights in a 
"rote-like manner" but may be sufficient to simply 
remind the person that the rights previously extended 
to them are still available with respect to the new 
offences59. In the course of an exploratory 
investigation, this does not require that the police 
reiterate the right to counsel every time the 
investigation touches on a different offence60. When 
new offences are mentioned during the course of an 
investigation, some opportunity will be permitted for 
the police to verify some of the information so as to 
determine if the statements should be taken 
seriously61. A restatement of the right to counsel is 
required only where there is a fundamental and 
discrete change in the purpose or nature of the 
investigation or the person's jeopardy changes62 (a 
substantial change63). 
 
 
Early Warning 
 
Although s.10(b) does not require 
the police to inform the person 
being investigated of their right 
to instruct counsel in the absence 
of an arrest or detention, the 
section does not prohibit the police from providing 
such advice at the commencement of or during an 
investigation. The precise moment when a detention 
arises is no means easy to determine and a police 
officer may lean towards greater caution by ensuring 
that a person is aware of their rights when an 
investigation commences or during its course, even 
though no detention may yet have crystallized. In R. v. 
Schmautz (1988) 41 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (B.C.C.A.) appeal to 
S.C.C. affirmed [1990] 1 S.C.R. 398 (S.C.C.), Wallace 
J.A. stated: 
                                                 
58 R. v. Evans [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.) per MacLachlin at pp.892-93. 
59 R. v. Witts (1998) 124 C.C.C. (3d) 410 (Man.C.A.) at p.414. 
60 R. v. Evans [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.). 
61 R. v. Whittle (1994) 92 C.C.C. (3d) 11 at p.35. 
62 R. v. Whittle (1994) 92 C.C.C. (3d) 11 at p.35. 
63 Paternak v. the Queen (1996) 110 C.C.C. (3d) 382 (S.C.C.). 
 
When one considers the nebulous nature of the 
circumstances which may in law constitute a detention or 
arrest, one can appreciate that an officer, acting out of 
an abundance of caution to ensure that an accused is fully 
aware of his rights, may choose to give the advice at the 
commencement of the investigation, thereby removing 
any doubt that the appellant is at all times fully aware of 
his right to instruct counsel. 
 
SNIFF AT CAR DOOR  
NOT A SEARCH 
R. v. Cormack, 
(2001) Docket:230/00 (OntSCJ) 
 
A uniform police officer on general 
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vehicles in an area populated by 
licensed establishments to 
determine if drivers had been drinking. As a 
consequence of this “blitz”, the officer stopped the 
accused who subsequently failed a road side screening 
test. The accused later provided breathalyzer readings 
at the police station that were over the legal limit. At 
trial, the accused was acquitted because the judge 
found the accused’s right under s.9 of the Charter, to 
be free from arbitrary detention, was violated by the 
random spot check and the violation was not saved by 
s.1. On appeal, the Ontario Supreme Court of Justice 
determined the trial judge erred in finding a Charter 
infringement and that the officer targeting drivers in 
an area with a high likelihood of impaired drivers was 
related to highway traffic concerns and therefore 
lawful. 
 
The accused also argued that his right to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure had been 
violated since the officer was not entitled to ‘sniff’ for 
an odour of alcohol to further a criminal investigation 
while examining matters circumscribed to highway 
safety (a similar argument by analogy to police entering 
onto private property to sniff at one’s door-R. v. Evans 
(1996) 104 C.C.C. (3d) 23 (S.C.C.)). In rejecting this 
argument, the Court stated, at para. 18: 
7
 As is frequently the case with attempted analogies, this 
one does not work.  It is a necessary and inevitable 
aspect of the investigation which police officers are 
permitted to undertake in furtherance of the authority 
given to them by section 216(1) of the Highway Traffic 
Act that they will be able to utilize their human senses 
and record observations consequent thereon.  Whether it 
is smelling the odour of alcohol, seeing glassy eyes or a 
flushed face or hearing slurred speech, it is all part of 
the investigatory function which the police officer is 
entitled to carry out. 
 
And further, at para.19: 
 
In my view it follows from that conclusion that the 
actions of police officers are not transformed from a 
non-search to a search merely because they are able to 
contemporaneously make sensory observations. 
 
The accused’s acquittal was set aside. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“[T]he citizen expects police officers to have the 
wisdom of Solomon, the courage of David, the strength 
of Sampson, the patience of Job, the leadership of 
Moses, the kindness of the good Samaritans, the 
strategical training of Alexander, the faith of Daniel, 
the diplomacy of Lincoln, the tolerance of the 
carpenter of Nazareth and finally an intimate 
knowledge of every branch of the natural, biological 
and social sciences. If [they] had all these [they] might 
be a good [police officer].” Professor August Vollmer. 
 
SEARCH OF DETAINED DRIVER 
REASONABLE 
R. v. Hewlin, 2001 NSCA 16 
 
The police had information the 
accused was trafficking in narcotics. 
As a result, the police placed his 
residence under surveillance. In the 
early evening, police observed two 
vehicles depart the residence. Police stopped the 
accused’s truck and the officer immediately recognized 
the accused from a past encounter. The officer’s 
original intention was to further the purpose of the 
surveillance but he also knew the accused to be a 
suspended or prohibited driver. The officer asked for 
a driver’s licence but the accused did not have any 
papers with him. The officer requested the accused 
exit his vehicle and accompany him back to the police 
car. The officer told the accused there would be a pat 
down search of his person. As a result, the accused 
removed from his pants pocket money and another 
object. The money was moved to his other hand, but 
the accused tossed the other object over a guard-rail 
and down an embankment near a ditch. The accused was 
released after the officer was satisfied the accused 
was licensed, but was told there may be consequences 
if the police find anything suspicious in the ditch. Police 
“secured” the area, called for a police service dog, and 
consequently recovered a small oblong container with 
16 hits of LSD. 
 
At trial, the Court found the detention of the accused 
lawful but the search unreasonable. The trial judge was 
of the opinion that the officer lacked objective 
evidence of suspicious or possible violent behaviour on 
the part of the accused. As a consequence, there were 
insufficient grounds to search the accused. On appeal, 
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal found the trial judge 
erred in law in concluding that the search was 
unreasonable. At para. 5, the unanimous court held: 
 
[W]e find that the search of the respondent was 
reasonable.  It was authorized by a common law power of 
search incident to a lawful detention or arrest.  This law 
has been found to be reasonable, and the search was 
reasonable in the manner in which it was carried out.  In 
the circumstances of this case, the trial judge erred by 
finding that the police officer needed independent grounds 
to perform a search incident to detention. 
 
The appeal court remitted the case back to the 
Provincial Court for the entering of a conviction and 
the imposition of a sentence. 
 
ABSENT DETENTION, NO 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
USA v. Fong, 2001 BCCA 684 
 
Canadian Customs Agents executed a 
search warrant at the accused’s 
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accused routed shipments of garlic 
from China through his Vancouver 
business bound to California. The accused declared the 
garlic to be from Taiwan thereby avoiding a 377% duty 
imposed by the US on Garlic from China. The accused 
was subject to an extradition proceeding by US 
officials alleging he deprived American Customs of $2 
million.  
 
A Canadian Customs officer presented the accused 
with the search warrant and the search commenced. 
8
 After finding some documents, the officer approached 
the accused and cautioned him about statements but 
did not provide the accused with the standard right to 
counsel warning. The accused did not respond to any of 
the officer’s questions. Later, the officer confronted 
the accused with a box of garlic labeled as a product of 
Taiwan and also documents showing the garlic came 
from China. The accused then made incriminating 
statements. The officer then asked the accused if he 
wished to provide a written statement; the accused 
stated he wanted to talk to a lawyer.  
 
The central issue on appeal was whether the accused 
was constitutionally detained during the execution of 
the search warrant. If he was, he was deprived of his 
right to counsel as guaranteed by s.10 of the Charter. 
If not, his right to counsel was not triggered. The 
Customs officers testified they did not restrict the 
accused’s freedom of movement in any way before or 
during the incriminating statement. On the other hand, 
the accused testified he felt he was constrained to 
stay in the warehouse as the five Customs officers 
conducted their search. The extradition judge found 
the accused was not detained within the meaning of 
s.10(b) of the Charter because the accused did not 
establish he reasonably believed he was under 
detention in the circumstances and noted the following 
points: 
 
• during the search, agents occasionally requested 
the accused move and assist in opening a drawer 
and a safe 
• at no point did Customs officers advise the 
accused he was free to leave nor that he was not 
free to leave nor indicate that he was being 
detained 
• the doors were not blocked and the officers were 
all involved in searching the premises 
• the accused acknowledged that none of the 
officers restricted his movements 
• the accused never sought clarification as to his 
status with the officers 
 
The accused appealed the extradition judge’s decision 
to the BCCA arguing that the statement was obtained 
in violation of his rights and therefore should be 
excluded. Without this statement, it was argued, the 
committal order of extradition was invalid; insufficient 
grounds remained to justify the order. Although 
Donald J.A. writing for the unanimous Court of Appeal 
recognized the issue of detention was not an easy 
question and acknowledged he may have come to a 
different conclusion on the issue, he could not say the 
extradition judge was wrong. As a consequence, the 
extradition judge’s finding was found to be reasonable 
and the appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
NfldCA RULES PAT DOWN 
SEARCH DURING TRAFFIC STOP 
UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Power, 2001 NFCA 50 
 
Police officers stopped the accused 
for crossing over the center line of 
a highway. One of the officers 
approached the accused and 
requested to see his driver’s licence, 
insurance, and proof of ownership for the vehicle. No 
alcohol, drugs, or weapons were visible nor was there 
any odour of alcohol or drugs at this point. The accused 
advised police the vehicle belonged to his mother, 
produced proof of her ownership and proof of 
insurance, but did not have his driver’s licence. The 
police officer asked the accused to accompany him 
back to the police cruiser; to check on his identity and 
to determine whether there were any warrants. The 
accused asked if he was under arrest and was told he 
was not. Before entering the back seat of the police 
car, the officer informed him he would be searched for 
weapons. The accused said he had none and the officer 
conducted a pat down search. After feeling something 
hard and something soft, the officer requested the 
accused remove his jacket. The accused complied and 
the officer found a packet of marihuana and a set of 
scales in the lining of the jacket. The accused was 
arrested and advised of his right to counsel.  
 
The accused was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking 
and was acquitted at trial. The trial judge found that 
there had been a breach of the accused’s s.8 Charter 
right and possibly a s.10(a) breach. The judge 
concluded that the accused had not been told of the 
reason why he was detained and that the officer had 
decided to search the accused on the way to the police 
car; not because his presence in the police car was 
necessary. The evidence was thus excluded. 
 
The Crown appealed the conviction arguing that as long 
as there was a lawful detention, the search was 
authorized by the common law power to search incident 
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 to a lawful detention and no additional reasons were 
necessary to justify the search. Furthermore, the 
Crown alleged that there was an “implied acquiescence 
to the search”. The unanimous Newfoundland Court of 
Appeal noted that the Crown was erroneously equating 
the common law power of search incident to arrest 
with the powers available on the mere detention of a 
suspect. The Court found the accused, although initially 
detained legally, had been subject to an unreasonable 
search. Gushue J.A. for the Court: 
 
[T]here was no reason to remove him from his vehicle or 
to place him in the police car, or, for that matter, to 
search him. The sole issue was the checking of whether 
the [accused] held a valid driver’s permit, which 
information could have been obtained with the [accused] 
remaining in his own vehicle. There was no legitimate 
suspicion of any criminal activity on the part of the 
[accused] and thus the police officer had no statutory 
authority to arrest him, nor any grounds to obtain a 
warrant to carry out a search. Nor was there any 
suspicion he carried a weapon. Even the [accused’s] 
omission to have on his person his driver’s permit was 
remediable by production of the licence at a police 
station within 48 hours (s.49(2) Highway Traffic Act). 
 
While the [accused] did not object to the search, 
obviously because he thought he had no choice, he 
certainly gave no informed consent to it. It was, as 
stated, a warrantless search and, being so, the onus was 
on the Crown to establish that it was reasonable… It is 
clear that in this matter, the search cannot be said to 
have been incident to the detention and there were no 
circumstances which would have made the 
search…justifiable or reasonable. (references omitted)  
 
And further, in rejecting the Crown’s argument that 
the evidence should none-the-less be admitted under 
s.24(2) of the Charter: 
 
… one cannot help but feel that the stated reason for the 
search, namely to look for weapons, was little more than a 
ruse to permit the police officer to act on an unfounded 
suspicion that the [accused] was carrying drugs and/or 
drug paraphernalia. If such a course of action by police 
officers were allowed, there would never be any reason 
for a warrant to be obtained. A driver being stopped for 
the most minor of Highway Traffic Act infractions could 
be removed from his or her vehicle and searched. 
Obviously, the courts cannot sanction or condone such 
conduct. (emphasis added) 
 
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed and the acquittal 
upheld. 
 
UNTESTED INFORMANT & 
OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES 
PROVIDE REASONABLE 
GROUNDS 
R. v. Beal, 2001 MBQB 297 
 
A Winnipeg police Sergeant received 
information from an informant that 
two males were selling cocaine from 
a suite for $100 a gram, mostly to 
the gay community. The first names 
of the suspects and descriptions (Arthur: Asian male, 
25 years, slim, 5’10, dark hair and Patrick: white male, 
25 years, slim, blonde hair), as well as the address of 
the apartment unit were provided. The information also 
reported that the two males delivered cocaine in a red 
BMW convertible with a Manitoba licence plate, which 
was also provided to police. The informant stated he 
had observed the males sell cocaine on only one 
occasion, which was within 24 hours of the informant 
providing the information.  Police determined that the 
registered owner of the vehicle (Chin Hang Ng) resided 
at the suite address provided by the informant and the 
city telephone directory also indicated a listing for an 
Arthur Ng at the suite.  
 
The Sergeant briefed other members of the 
department and several of them set out to conduct 
surveillance with respect to the information. The 
Sergeant and his partner went to the apartment 
building where they located the BMW and subsequently 
observed a female and a male (white with blonde hair) 
walk to and enter the vehicle. With the female driving, 
police followed the vehicle for a short distance where 
it stopped in front of another apartment building. The 
female driver left the vehicle, entered the apartment 
building, and returned within 3-5 minutes. As the 
vehicle departed, the Sergeant determined that the 
vehicle should be stopped and the occupants arrested; 
he instructed the other members of his surveillance 
team to participate. As a result, the vehicle was boxed 
in by the police surveillance team. The Sergeant 
proceeded to the driver’s side, opened the door, 
commanded the female driver to exit, and arrested 
her. The Sergeant’s partner went to the passenger’s 
side, opened the door, pulled the accused from the 
vehicle, placed him on the ground, and handcuffed him. 
In the course of the accused’s removal from the 
vehicle, a black bag came out and fell about 2 feet 
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 from the accused and was seized by police. The 
fundamental issue at trial was whether the arrest was 
lawful and whether the seizure of the bag was 
incidental to arrest. 
 
Validity of the Arrest 
 
The Sergeant testified that he made the decision to 
arrest the accused based on the information he had 
and his extensive experience. As a consequence, the 
officer believed the vehicle was being used to deliver 
cocaine (an indictable offence) to an apartment. In 
assessing whether the officer had reasonable grounds, 
MacInnes J. of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench 
defined reasonable grounds in these terms: 
 
A peace officer who arrests without warrant must 
subjectively have reasonable and probable grounds on 
which to base the arrest and, in addition, those grounds 
must be justifiable from an objective point of view, i.e., a 
reasonable person placed in the position of the officer 
must be able to conclude that there were indeed 
reasonable and probable ground for the arrest. 
 
In finding that the officer had reasonable grounds and 
the subsequent arrest lawful, the Court considered the 
following three criteria in assessing the information: 
 
1. was the information compelling? 
2. was the source credible? 
3. was the information corroborated? 
 
The Court found the information offered much detail; 
it named and described two sellers, it provided an 
exact address, it gave the description and licence 
number of the alleged courier vehicle, the price of 
cocaine, the market sold to, and the information was 
provided not by one who heard about the operation or 
through rumor, but by a person who had actually seen a 
sale by the named people in the suite within the 
preceding 24 hours. Although the informant was 
untested (which sometimes may be fatal), the police 
corroborated a number of facts; the registered owner 
of the vehicle (Ng) resided at the apartment, the 
telephone directory indicated Arthur Ng lived at the 
suite, and police attended at the apartment building 
observing the suspect vehicle parked there. Prior to 
the arrest the police observed a white male with 
blonde hair exit the apartment building and enter the 
vehicle, the vehicle was driven only a short distance 
from the apartment building within the gay community, 
and the police observed the vehicle drive in front of an 
apartment building, the driver exit, enter the 
apartment building, and return within minutes.  
Since the arrest was based on reasonable grounds and 
lawful, the black bag and its contents which came out 
of the vehicle concurrent with the arrest was properly 
seized as an incident to arrest. Furthermore, the fact 
that the female resided in the apartment building in 
which the vehicle had driven to is of no consequence 
since “information learned after the arrest is 
irrelevant to a determination” of whether reasonable 
grounds existed.  
  
CHANGING MIND AFTER 
CONSULTING COUNSEL OF NO 
CONSEQUENCE: REFUSAL 
COMPLETE 
R. v. McKeen,  
(2001) 151 CCC (3d) 449 (NSCA) 
 
A police officer responding to a 
complaint of an impaired driver and 
a fight between family members 
arrived on scene to find the accused 
and another man standing near the 
driver’s door of a van “arm locked” and involved in a 
confrontation. The accused was “notably intoxicated”, 
upset, and yelling with slurred speech. The officer was 
told that the accused was drunk, had moved the van, 
and that the people were trying to prevent the accused 
from driving. The officer detained the accused who 
became physically and verbally abusive which 
necessitated handcuffing. As the officer led the 
accused to the police car, he provided a “quick Charter 
warning” from memory. The officer locked the accused 
in the rear of the police car for at least 20 minutes 
while he spoke to witnesses.  
 
After completing the on site investigation and because 
the accused was “causing quite a stir” in the back seat, 
the officer drove a few hundred feet from the house, 
stopped on the roadside, and read the complete 
Charter warning from a card indicating the accused was 
under investigation for impaired driving and causing a 
disturbance. When asked if he understood, the accused 
pretended he did not understand English and spoke in 
German. The officer also advised the accused of his 
right to silence. When asked if he wished to contact a 
lawyer the accused would not acknowledge that he 
understood and kept speaking German. The officer 
read the right to counsel advice at least three times. 
Next, the officer read the breath demand and 
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 explained the consequences of refusing. The accused 
refused, protesting he was not behind the wheel of any 
vehicle.  
 
The accused was taken to the cells at the detachment 
and the officer assisted the accused in arranging 
telephone access to a lawyer. Following the call, the 
accused told the officer he changed his mind and now 
wished to provide a sample of breath. The officer 
explained to the accused that he had already accepted 
the refusal. The accused was convicted at trial of 
refusing to provide a breath sample and appealed his 
conviction in part on the basis that his s.10(b) Charter 
right to counsel without delay was violated; he was not 
advised of his right to counsel after the demand was 
made and he was not provided the opportunity to speak 
to counsel before his refusal was accepted. 
 
In dismissing the accused’s appeal, the majority (2:1) 
of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal found the accused 
had been provided one brief and three full Charter 
warnings prior to the breathalyzer demand. The 
demand was directly related to the investigation that 
the officer told the accused was occurring and arose 
immediately following the officer’s inquiries. The 
jeopardy facing the accused at the time the demand 
arose did not change significantly from that which the 
officer was initially investigating and thus did not 
trigger an additional duty upon the officer to further 
advise the accused of his right to counsel. In addition, 
the accused had at no time given any indication that he 
wished to exercise his right to counsel up to the point 
of refusal. Had the accused expressed such a desire, 
the police would have been required to provide the 
accused a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right 
and to cease eliciting a response from the accused to 
the breath demand until that opportunity had been 
provided. The absence of a telephone at the roadside 
where the demand was taking place was irrelevant. The 
accused “had chosen, of his own free will, to ignore 
repeated opportunities to consult counsel, and he had 
refused to take the breathalyzer test”. The fact the 
officer later asked the accused at the detachment if 
he wanted to contact a lawyer64 had nothing to do with 
the breath demand and “did not revive a right” that the 
accused had previously refused to exercise. The 
evidence of the refusal was admissible. 
 
                                                 
64 The officer testified it was always his practice to ask an arrestee he brings to 
the detachment cells if they wished to contact a lawyer.  
POLICE ENTITLED TO 
QUESTION WITNESS W/O 
ADVISING OF COUNSEL 
R.v. D.E.M.,  
(2001) 156 CCC (3d) 239 (ManCA) 
 
The accused drove her car to attend 
a drinking party at her brother’s and 
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at the party, the accused brought up 
the sexual assault of her brother’s 
and his partner’s three-year-old daughter by a man 
named Vallieres, which angered people at the party 
including the accused. The people at the party felt 
they should find Vallieres and scare him.  The accused, 
in company her three co-accused, drove from the party 
to the rooming house where Vallieres resided. At the 
rooming house, Vallieres was located and severely 
assaulted. The accused and her companions then fled 
the rooming house.  
 
Two police officers in the area stopped at a pay phone 
to speak with the accused who had been in the process 
of calling the police to report the assault. The accused 
described the condition of Vallieres and reported she 
had been present when he was beaten. The officers 
asked the accused to accompany then to Vallieres’ 
rooming house. During the drive, the accused described 
the circumstances of the beating to the officers.  
When they arrived at the rooming house where the 
beating occurred, one officer remained with the 
accused while the second officer went into the rooming 
house. When this officer returned to the police car, 
the accused was again asked what happened but this 
time gave a different version of the events of the 
beating. At 7:13 am, the officer cautioned the accused 
that she may be charged with aggravated assault and 
told her not to say anything. Furthermore, she was told 
she was a material witness and that she would have to 
accompany the officers to the police station. Upon 
arrival at the police station she was placed in a locked 
interview room and told the officers that she “ain’t 
saying nothing”. At 8:30 am the accused was advised of 
her right to counsel and expressed a desire to contact 
counsel, however she was not given the opportunity to 
contact the lawyer of her choice. At 8:34 am she 
advised the officer that she did not want to talk about 
the matter. 
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 The accused remained in the interview room until 4:44 
pm at which time a second team of officers took over 
the interviewing process. The accused declined to talk 
”on the record” or provide a formal statement 
Approximately 20-30 minutes later the accused was 
permitted to leave the police station. 
 
Nine days later, two different police officers now 
investigating the incident located the accused at a 
Legion hall (in a different city than the assault 
occurred) and asked her to accompany them to the 
local RCMP detachment. Initially the accused 
expressed reluctance to go but eventually did agree to 
accompany the officers. At no time did the officers 
tell the accused that she was or was not obligated to 
go with them for questioning. After interviewing her 
for approximately 47 minutes the accused asked if she 
needed a lawyer, at which time the interview was 
terminated and she was arrested and advised of her 
right to counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter, and 
provided the standard caution. She immediately 
requested to speak to her lawyer. 
 
At her trial on the charges of aggravated assault and 
break and enter, the trial judge found the accused’s 
rights during the first interview had been violated 
because police had ignored both her requests to remain 
silent and to contact legal counsel. All statements were 
ruled inadmissible as evidence. However, the trial judge 
found that the accused rights to counsel were not 
violated during the second interview. The officer had 
not detained the accused until she had been arrested. 
Prior to the arrest, the accused had been requested to 
accompany the officers and was regarded solely as a 
material witness. It was not until the police regarded 
her as a suspect (when her story changed yet another 
time) during this second interview that her s.10(b) 
rights were triggered. All statements made prior to 
the arrest were admissible. 
 
The accused appealed to the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
arguing that the request by police to accompany them 
to the RCMP detachment must be examined against the 
backdrop of the earlier interview where the accused’s 
rights were clearly violated.  The accused submitted 
that she was “psychologically detained” because she 
perceived she was obligated to comply with all requests 
made by the police at the Legion; “the “demand or 
direction” to accompany the police was followed by her 
acquiescence because she reasonably believed she had 
no choice to do otherwise”. 
 
In dismissing the accused appeal, the Manitoba Court 
of Appeal noted that not every attendance of an 
individual at a police station will result in a detention. 
In this case, the accused was not considered a suspect 
until part way through the subsequent interview: 
 
It is unrealistic to expect the police to caution each 
person they interview in an attempt to obtain information 
about a crime. It is also unrealistic to expect the police 
to caution a witness each time they interview her, as long 
as she is still viewed as a witness and not a suspect. 
 
The onus in proving a breach of their Charter rights 
lies with the accused, who in this case did not testify. 
There was no evidence of the accused’s state of mind 
or her reasons for accompanying the police to the 
RCMP detachment from the Legion. Furthermore, the 
Court rejected the argument that because the accused 
was detained on the first occasion and subsequently 
released that the second contact amounted to an 
immediate detention: 
 
There is no concept in law of “once detained, always 
detained,” which concept the [accused] invites this court 
to accept. 
 
The statements during the final interview prior to the 
caution of the accused were admissible. 
 
RECKLESSNESS INSUFFICIENT 
SUBSTITUTE FOR KNOWLEDGE 
OF PSP OFFENCE 
R.v. Vinokurov, 2001 ABCA 113 
 
The accused, who was the manager 
of a pawn shop, was convicted of 7 
Volume 2 Issue 1 
January 2002 counts of possession of stolen 
property in receiving property from 
a customer who stole the items from 
a series of break and enters. The accused completed all 
the required paperwork respecting the property 
(pawnshop sheets forwarded to police), made inquiries 
with his mother (the owner of the pawnshop) to 
determine whether he should purchase the 
merchandise. and denied knowing the items were stolen. 
The customer had produced his birth certificate and 
Corrections Canada release card as identification to 
the accused.  
 
The Alberta Court of Appeal (2:1) quashed the 
accused’s convictions and ordered a new trial. To prove 
the offence of possession of stolen property, the 
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 Crown has the burden of proving the accused knew the 
property was stolen. One such way of proving this mens 
rea component is by the doctrine of willful blindness 
because it is the equivalent of actual knowledge. In 
citing R. v. Jorgensen, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 55), the test for 
willful blindness was expressed as follows: 
 
A finding of willful blindness involves an affirmative 
answer to the question: Did the accused shut his eyes 
because he knew or strongly suspected that looking would 
fix him with knowledge? 
 
In willful blindness cases the person chooses to remain 
ignorant because they do not wish to know the truth. 
Recklessness, the standard the trial judge used, is a 
reasonable person standard not equivalent to actual 
knowledge and therefore is insufficient in satisfying 
the mens rea requirement. Recklessness presupposes 
knowledge and arises when a person persists in their 
conduct knowing that there is a risk of danger; they 
see the risk but take the chance. In imputing 
knowledge on the basis of recklessness and not willful 
blindness, the trial judge erred. 
 
Complete case at www.albertacourts.ca. 
 
OVERHEARD CONVERSATION 
BETWEEN LAWYER & CLIENT 
INADMISSIBLE 
R.v.Hunter,  
(2001) Docket:C30902 (OntCA) 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled 
an overheard conversation by a 
The Crown called a witness who testified that he was 
walking past the accused and his lawyer in an open area 
on the day of the preliminary hearing and heard the 
accused say, “I had a gun, but I didn’t point it”. It was 
acknowledged that the witness only heard part of the 
conversation and could not give the context of the 
utterance. The accused denied having a gun or telling 
his lawyer he had one; the lawyer also denied the 
conversation. The defence alleged police brutality and 
the possible planting of evidence.   
 
The accused was convicted at the end of his fourth 
trial on these charges. The accused appealed arguing 
the threshold test of reliability was not met because 
the meaning of the overheard conversation could not 
be determined without its context and furthermore its 
meaning is so speculative its prejudicial effect 
outweighs its tenuous probative value. In agreeing with 
the defence’s position, the unanimous Ontario Court of 
Appeal found the context of spoken words can be 
critical to its meaning: 
 
Where an overheard utterance is known to have a verbal 
context, but that context is itself unknown, it may be 
impossible to know the meaning of the overheard words 
or otherwise conclude that those words represent a 
complete thought regardless of context. Even if the 
overheard words can be said to have any relevance, where 
their meaning is speculative and their probative value 
therefore tenuous yet their prejudicial effect 
substantial, the overheard words should be excluded. 
 
The Court provided two examples of how the accused’s 
words could have been taken out of context and would 
not constitute an admission: 
 passerby between the accused and 
his lawyer is inadmissible. The 
accused had been charged with 
attempted murder of a police officer, use of a firearm, 
aggravated assault, and possession of a prohibited 
weapon. It was alleged that the accused pulled out a 
gun and attempted to shoot an officer after police 
pursued him on foot following a disturbance outside a 
restaurant in Toronto. The accused ran down a narrow 
passageway, and when an officer shone his flashlight, 
he saw the accused, crouched on his knees pointing a 
gun at him. The officer heard a clicking noise, the gun 
did not fire, and the accused again fled until he was 
apprehended by an officer who applied a bear hug. The 
gun was recovered from the accused but no 
fingerprints were found on the gun.  
 
• “I could say I had a gun, but I didn’t point it, but I won’t 
because it is not true”. 
 
• “What if the jury finds I had a gun but I didn’t point it-is 
that aggravated assault? 
 
The accused’s conviction was set aside and a stay of 
proceedings was imposed because putting the accused 
on trial for a fifth time would constitute an abuse of 
process.   
 
Editor’s Note: In addition to the number of trials the 
accused was subject to, the Court used other factors 
in deciding whether a stay of proceedings was the 
appropriate remedy. Among these factors, the Court 
noted that without the overheard evidence there was 
little evidence to support the Crown’s case. In 
particular, the Crown’s case relied heavily on the 
evidence of the three plain-clothes officers involved. 
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 The Court highlighted several points concerning the 
evidence of the police witnesses which were considered 
in imposing the stay of proceedings; the evidence 
included a chase of an armed man without calling for 
backup, the officer who was fired at did not worn the 
others of this, and the officer who finally approached 
and grabbed the accused did so without his gun drawn 
nor did he make any mention of seeing the gun in his 
notes.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
 
NON-DISCLOSURE OF INITIAL 
WARRANT REFUSAL NOT FATAL 
R. v. Colbourne, 
(2001) Docket:C33748 (OntCA) 
 
The accused, in company his 
passenger friend, was driving his 
should the police decide to seize the sample. The 
accused was allowed to leave the hospital with his wife. 
The officer later made two search warrant applications 
to seize the blood samples from the hospital.  Two days 
after the accident, the officer made his first 
application but the warrant was refused. The officer 
used a pre-printed form and was unaware of the practice 
of attaching appendices setting out the reasonable 
grounds. The officer put his grounds for belief within 
the one-inch space on the preprinted form. The 
information sworn was destroyed or lost prior to 
disclosure and the officer could not recall exactly what 
it stated. The officer understood the warrant was 
refused because of the lack of detail in the information. 
 
After speaking with a Crown lawyer and the JP who 
refused the warrant, the officer prepared a second 
information with more detail and the use of appendices. 
Although the officer intended to swear this new 
information before the JP who had refused the first truck on a flat, dry two lane highway 
during ideal driving conditions when 
his truck suddenly veered into the 
oncoming lane from behind the vehicle he was tailgating, 
traveled over a gravel shoulder, across a ditch, became 
airborne, and struck a tree killing his passenger. The 
investigating officer attended the scene approximately 
½ hour after the accident. The accused was receiving 
medical attention and the officer detected a strong 
odour of alcohol on the accused’s breath as well as 
observing that the accused’s face was red and flushed. 
The accused was transported by ambulance to the 
hospital where samples of his blood were taken with his 
consent for medical purposes; there was no police 
involvement in the taking of these samples.  
 
The officer arrived at the hospital and was told by the 
attending physician that the accused was conscious and 
could provide a breath sample. The officer briefly spoke 
to the accused, confirmed his earlier observations 
concerning the consumption of alcohol, arrested the 
accused, and read him his right to counsel. The accused 
asked that his oxygen mask be removed and the 
attending physician told the officer he would have to 
stop questioning the accused because further medical 
treatment was necessary. An attempt to take a breath 
sample was aborted because the breathalyzer technician 
mistakenly believed it was not authorized under the 
Criminal Code. Aware the blood samples had been taken, 
the officer was directed by a supervisor to place a seal 
on one of the blood samples to preserve continuity 
application, the courthouse was closed and the officer 
swore the second information before a different JP 
without any reference to the initial refusal. The warrant 
was executed and the blood alcohol analysis along with 
an expert interpretation showed the accused’s blood 
alcohol level at the time of the accident to be between 
232 and 255 mg%.  
 
The accused was convicted at trial of impaired driving 
causing death and appealed the conviction, among other 
grounds, on the issue that the officer failed to disclose 
to the second JP the initial refusal of the warrant. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal held that such a non-disclosure 
could invalidate a warrant, despite the existence of 
reasonable grounds, if it was made for some improper 
motive or was intended to mislead the JP. However, 
since the reasons for the non-disclosure were not the 
product of an improper motive or an attempt to mislead, 
the “question becomes whether the second [JP] acting 
judicially and having been advised of the prior refusal 
could have issued the warrant”. In this case, the second 
information contained much more detail than the first 
and the disclosure of the initial refusal would not have 
precluded the issuance of the warrant by the second JP. 
Had the second information simply been a repeat of the 
first information, the initial refusal would have played a 
significant role in how the second JP exercised their 
discretion. Since the informations were very different, 
the appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca. 
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 WARRANTLESS ENTRY TO 
SECURE SCENE REASONABLE 
R. v. Castro, Stinchcombe, & Ferretti, 
2001 BCCA 507 
 
The three accused were convicted 
of drug offences as a result of a 
reverse sting operation known as 
Project Eye Spy. Police intercepted 
telephone calls between the accused 
suggesting they were organizing a drug deal at a hotel. 
Police set up surveillance on the hotel and observed two 
men who appeared to be keeping watch outside two 
rooms (room 309 and 310) registered to the accused 
Stinchcombe. At 11:30 pm the accused Castro and 
Ferretti, carrying a brown bag, arrived and entered 
room 309. About one hour later, Castro and Ferretti 
left the room without the brown bag and were 
arrested. Neither drugs nor large amounts of money 
were found on them. At 2:40 am another man, 
identified as Mostell, left the hotel room and was 
followed by police, but they subsequently lost contact 
with his vehicle. It was not known whether this man 
left with any drugs or money. Although they did not 
have a warrant, police decided to enter the two hotel 
rooms fearing the occupants may have been alerted by 
Mostell of the police presence and were either 
destroying the evidence or barricading themselves in 
the rooms. In room 309 police found two people and 
Stinchcombe asleep in room 310. Police obtained a 
search warrant and under the mattress in room 310 
police found a kilogram of cocaine in a duct-taped 
package. Stinchcombe was arrested and the other two 
men provided evidence implicating the three accused. 
 
Although the British Columbia Court of Appeal ordered 
a new trial on a disclosure issue, the Court rejected 
Stinchcombe’s appeal that the drugs seized in the 
search of the two adjoining hotel rooms should be 
excluded because the initial entry to the rooms was 
made without warrant. At para. 47, Donald J.A. for the 
unanimous Court held: 
 
It is important to note that the entry team secured the 
scene but did not conduct a search. The search was 
postponed until later that morning when a warrant was 
issued. After a search the police found a kilogram of 
cocaine under the mattress… 
 
And further, at para. 49: 
 
The trial judge found that the entry was necessary to 
preserve evidence in exigent circumstances and that the 
police action did not exceed the requirements of the 
situation as no search occurred until a warrant was 
issued. The drugs were found as a result of a search 
authorized by a warrant. There was a real risk that 
Mostell, who eluded the police, could have tipped off 
those in the rooms. In my view, therefore, the finding of 
exigent circumstances was supported by the evidence. I 
can see no reason to disagree with the trial judge’s 
disposition of this issue. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“An angry person who curses a police officer will not be 
condemned by people generally. The attitude will be 
taken that such behaviour is understandable considering 
the circumstances. Even if a person being arrested 
strikes a police officer, onlookers would probably 
consider it a natural response to being arrested. On the 
other hand, if a police officer curses at someone or 
strikes an individual in any other situation except 
obvious self defence, it becomes an entirely different 
matter. [The officer’s] uniform, [the officer’s] gun, and 
the organization behind [the officer] provide certain 
advantages that [the officer] brings into any 
confrontation with others. Consequently, [the officer] is 
required to act with restraint65”. Anne T. Romano 
 
WEAPON ALERT 
 
The switchblade lighter knife is spring-loaded and 
opens and closes with the touch of a button. The 
lighter is butane refillable and has an adjustable flame! 
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